2.3 It was made clear to the Inquiry that such a plan and its cascade should determine how command and control is exercised. In Devon, as elsewhere, it soon became clear that MAFF did not have among its ranks those who could lead operations in the field. It is of course the prerogative of Ministers to determine and instigate policy after due advice from appropriate sources, but the Contingency Plan should be implemented nationally by someone able to command respect and with experience of managing emergency operations. But action on the ground in all senses must be in the hands of those used to command and with a sufficient support system to be effective. Much was made to us of the contrast of achievement between a Brigadier in Cumbria and a Major in Devon. Experience must be a factor in that, but Brigadiers also bring systems (brigades) with them, command is understood, respect is shown externally and much else flows from those characteristics. The Chief Constable explained his emergency control system to us and indicated his frustration at the limitations the military authority appeared to apply to itself (in contrast to the Cumbrian situation). He clearly would have been happier in control, but also made it clear that ‘that time is long past’. In any case it is equally clear that the constabulary has a full time job to do in normal times and that job does not diminish during crises of this long duration. Available military manpower is on the other hand able to detach itself from training and ceremonial to concentrate on the temporary job in hand. The role of the police in upholding the law (even against other parts of the civil power) and in movement control during disease outbreaks of this kind is nevertheless a critical component of a Contingency Plan.

2.4 We find that in the field handling all the operational consequences of combating the disease there would best be a military command, at least at brigadier level, from Day One of the outbreak. He or she should work closely alongside the Chief Constable whose roles are already clearly defined and should have environmental and veterinary aides at his or her elbow.

2.5 The Inquiry heard that a culture of secrecy was perceived within MAFF, public communication was poor to non-existent, and this led to an atmosphere of suspicion, confusion, changing advice and inconsistencies. This in turn was reflected by farmers, the media and other organisations with which the Ministry had dealings.

2.6 We find that from Day One open two-way communication must begin within the operational organisation and with all third parties. It is vital that timely and accurate information is provided to individuals and communities likely to be affected in an outbreak. This must include farmers and all those who provide local support and advice such as parish clergy.

2.7 Effective communications must therefore be at the heart of any emergency response for that response to be successful. It is essential that efficient two-way communications are recognised in advance as being central to the effectiveness of any contingency planning and rigorously tested in regular local, regional and national exercises.

2.8 Communication planning must involve all organisations required to deal with any future outbreak. There must be, however, professional management of a communications ‘control centre’ within the structure of the overall command. Within that context, each organisation must have a plan for its own communicating responsibilities and must consult partner agencies to ensure that all the information which it dispenses is up-to-date, consistent and recognises each agency’s specific role and responsibilities.

2.9 The media can be an important source of public information and could greatly assist in the dissemination of accurate information. But the media, like nature, abhors a vacuum and, in the absence of official information, will be filled from alternative sources, including rumour. All information must be clear, open and honest, and political considerations should be set aside. The media should be involved in communications planning and exercises.

2.10 The good lessons learned from the preparation for and response to the multi-agency communications for the 1999 Eclipse and, to a lesser extent, the Millennium Bug need to be adopted and adapted. We therefore find that contingency planning should include provision for county (or regional as appropriate) communications centres staffed by specialists from the organisations involved and should identify suitable venues which can be activated speedily. Such centres need to make the best use of broadcast media - television, radio and Internet - and it is essential that a proactive partnership is established with media organisations to achieve this goal.

2.11 We heard from one professional witness that MAFF/DEFRA exceeded the limits of legislation current during the outbreak and undertook actions for which there was little or no legal power granted. This was especially the case in connection with

• limited powers to slaughter animals on contiguous farms, the “contiguous cull” policy;
• limited powers in relation to the taking of blood samples;
• the unlawful construction of the Ash Moor pits without planning permission and insufficient consultation with the local planning authority;
• the breach of MAFF’s own guidelines in actions such as the temporary storage of carcasses on farms and at pyre sites, liable to cause pollution of surface and ground water (the role of the Environment Agency in these actions was questioned by one witness);
• statutory nuisance caused by pyres (other than smoke) which, it was said did not apply to MAFF during a time of emergency. This was not in fact the case.

There were other dubious statements by MAFF/DEFRA, for example that the co-operation of farmers was needed for a vaccination policy to operate (not so) or, where operations were organised on behalf of MAFF by the Ministry of Defence, the MoD became liable for environmental damage (again, not so).

We find that if it is contemplated that future epidemics must be tackled in the same way as in 2001 then the existing statutory provisions should be urgently reviewed in consultation with all those bodies whose functions are involved to ensure that an unequivocally clear and properly stocked arsenal is in place to legitimise that response.

2.12 We summarise below the areas where we have found substantial lack of knowledge and where research, therefore, needs to be undertaken with urgency:

• the cost benefit comparison of preventing the arrival and spread of the disease with the handling of the outbreak and eliminating the disease after that;
• vaccination for both continuous protection against an outbreak and for containment of an outbreak;
• risk assessment of the use of the public access network in each highway authority area and national park;
• transmission of FM virus(es) by all the possible vectors but especially inanimate ones such as boots, anoraks or tyres;
• separating and refining animal movement control for different purposes such as finishing stock from the hill, for trade, for containing the disease, for lambing and calving and for other animal welfare reasons.